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Abstract: In recent years, the comparative perspective has become increasingly used as a methodological 
approach to human rights research in the scientific literature. This paper is not intended to summarise the 
virtues and shortcomings that can be attributed to comparative legal research in the specific field of human 
rights. Rather, its aim is to critically reconsider its interdisciplinary role and, in particular, to reflect on two 
of the most popular methods in this field of research: legal comparison and the case study method. Firstly, 
this paper reviews the method in question, including its typologies and grounds for use. Secondly, it outlines 
the techniques that determine what and how to compare. Finally, a SWOT evaluation of comparative legal 
research on human rights is provided, identifying its strengths and weaknesses in order to dispel false 
myths. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, the comparative approach has been undeniably important in the 
production of scientific knowledge, including interdisciplinary human rights research, an 
area where its use will predictably increase further in the future because it is an attractive 
proposition for all fields of study. Firstly, because it is a way of seeing and a cross-cutting 
cognition process that allows the method to be extended. Secondly, as noted by Landman 
(2002: 891), comparative research can be considered ‘the best social scientific work’ 
(Stanfield 1993: 25) or it can be categorically stated that unless one makes comparisons, 
one cannot claim to be doing science (Sartori 1991) and thirdly, common issues related 
to human rights research can be found in countries around the world.  
                                                        
1 This study has been carried out under a postdoctoral research contract from the University of Deusto, 
reference RYC 2016-19465, within the Ramón y Cajal programme, Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness. I have been supported by two projects: Socio-cultural challenges and Human Rights in a 
changing world. Project in support of the activities of recognised research groups in the Basque university 
system (ref.: (IT1224-19) (Group recognised as part of category A), and R & D & i MINECO/FEDER 
Project, Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, and European Regional Development Fund:  
‘Complex inequality in plural societies. Public policy indicators’, ref. DER 2016-77711-P. Email: 
elaspina@deusto.es. 
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Generally, human rights studies tend to compare experiences or solutions in 
different contexts and situations to better understand the complexity of the legal, political, 
economic and cultural systems involved. In fact, the main object of comparative research 
in human rights is to identify and grasp the differences between institutions and legal 
systems from a global perspective, as well as to offer specific solutions to legal conflicts 
or issues raised to combine both systematic capacity and analytical capacity. The action 
of comparing can be an extremely complex task, because human rights cannot be 
understood without a historical-political and socioeconomic perspective (Losano, 2002: 
25-35).  This has been a field where the use of ‘prefabricated’ categories and concepts 
derived from the doctrine and jurisprudence has traditionally been deemed to be valid, 
without considering the contexts or the socio-historical circumstances involved. The need 
to analyse human rights from within and from the perspective of specific contexts is very 
recent, and has occurred thanks to a paradigm shift. A paradigm that has led to with a 
departure from the traditional predominance of the positivist-formalist conception or 
theoretical/cognitive thinking in human rights research, and to the introduction of new 
approaches relying on complex thinking.  
 
As a result of this shift, it has been possible to rise above a binary conception of 
knowledge within strict parameters: theory/practice, what-is/what-should-be and 
structure/function; the absence of critical thinking in the face of memory-based and 
discursive accumulated knowledge. In contrast, despite some resistance, the progressive 
move towards complex thought has promoted an analysis of knowledge on the 
assumption that reality is changing, multidimensional, and indeterminate. According to 
this, it is necessary a dynamic articulation (texts and context), empirical references are 
sought (Aymerich 2001), and theory is subordinated to the effort of reconstructing the 
problem by shifting the initial problem into a theoretical object of study (Witker 2017).  
 
The versatility and methodological centrality of the comparative approach in this 
field makes it possible to successfully analyse the complexity of social transformations 
and how those systems and sources of human rights address a specific issue in a ‘cross-
cultural, cross-national or transcontinental’ way (Fideli 1998). In addition, the 
introduction of comparative research into the social sciences and legal studies replaces 
empirical experimentation and makes it possible to order images, classify them and 
highlight their qualities, identify differences and similarities between them, propose 
classifications, discover trends and counter-examples and reveal successful models as 
opposed to others in decline.  
 
Although the action of comparing is an almost instinctive reflex and a remarkable 
approach, this is not always the preferred or chosen methodology for human rights 
research among all the myriad of methods available to the researcher. In fact, when 
looking at the contents of specialist journals on human rights, it becomes clear that legal 
comparison and/or comparative methods have a relative scientific impact. This is in 
contrast with the number of doctoral theses or monographic publications in the area of 
human rights, totally or partially, which –strictly speaking– include a comparative 
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analysis.2 These are largely doctoral dissertations that include some Comparative Law 
aspects or the micro-comparative method, but in most cases, they are intuitively applied. 
Any attempt at legal comparison is inherently difficult precisely because of its 
methodological and content-based nature, which involve identifying differences and/or 
similarities. The more sustainable or viable legal comparisons are those that capture a 
kind of global cartography or a mere contextualisation at the macro or micro level. 
However, if the different normative realities are separated, the comparative analysis is 
usually a simplified and performative instrument to shape a global law (Moreno 2017). 
 
Beyond providing quantitative evidences, its presence in human rights research is 
more significant when measured in qualitative terms because this varies across countries, 
specific topics, different levels of development of research teams, the degree of 
interdisciplinary of scientific institutes and legal training programmes in human rights. 
For instance, an illustrative field of interdisciplinary research on human rights is that of 
international migrations and, particularly, migrant integration studies. I choose this as a 
comprehensive, critical and heterogeneous example of comparative methods due to these 
gaps and limits. Except for a few exceptions, the migration comparative perspective has 
a marked discursive sociological, historical and political focus that is almost exclusively 
centred on verifying figures, facts or social factors. This results in other ways of situating 
the object of the immigration or ‘integration’ from an analytical and normative 
perspective are disregarded (La Spina 2016).3  
 
Given the miscellaneous areas and interests found, this article will explore the 
complexity and versatility of comparative analysis in human rights research, looking 
transversally at migrant integration studies. This involves identifying what can be 
compared, how it can be compared, and for the purpose is of making a comparison, and 
whether it could or should be done, especially bearing in mind the different functions 
pursued at the methodological level and the most widespread techniques. The cross-
                                                        
2 For example, a quick review the table of contents of The Age of Human Rights Journal, Revista Deusto 
de Derechos Humanos and the Revista Derechos y Libertades, among others, from 2008 (the year in which 
the project started and the HURIAGE Consolider network was created) to the present day shows, include 
very few studies using a comparative perspective, and even fewer that include –strictly speaking– a 
comparative methodology. See among others, those that include the use of a comparative perspective in 
their content, and analyse two or three contexts or systems of protection in Human Rights, are merely 
exceptions. However, the situation is very different for international specialist human rights journals, such 
as for example, Human Rights Law Review (https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/search-
results?page=1&q=comparative&fl_SiteID=5167&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1) and others in the 
Dialnet repository , 
(https://dialnet.unirioja.es/buscar/documentos?querysDismax.DOCUMENTAL_TODO=perspectiva%20c
omparada%20y%20derechos%20humanos&filtros.DOCUMENTAL_FACET_ENTIDAD=artrev). 
This is without prejudice to some theses that do choose the comparative perspective, according to the result 
of a simple search in Teseo or Dialnet, for example,  
(https://dialnet.unirioja.es/buscar/tesis?querysDismax.DOCUMENTAL_TODO=perspectiva+comparada
+y+derechos+humanos).  
3 These include some articles published in the European Journal of Migration and Law, and some 
publications in the IMISCOE Research series. But a good part are comparisons with those carried out 
strictly by jurists that predominantly use the format of reports produced either by European Union 
institutions in collaboration with academic institutions or by international organisations, including selected 
case law. See, among others IOM, EMN, ECRE, ILPO, FRA, AIDA, and the OECD.  
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sectional study of the integration of migrants will be briefly outlined as a practical 
example of how a comparative perspective can be used in human rights research and why 
false myths are associated to legal comparative research.  
 
This article is structured as follows: firstly, its reviews the method in question, its 
historical evolution, its typologies and its grounds for use; secondly, it outlines the two 
most established techniques: legal comparison and the case study; and, thirdly, it provides 
a SWOT evaluation of comparative legal research, taking into account its potential and 
weaknesses in order to dispel false myths or barriers within this interdisciplinary field. 
 
I. THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND THE GENERATION OF 
KNOWLEDGE: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, GROUNDS FOR USE AND MAIN 
ELEMENTS 
 
In recent decades, explanations, descriptions and interpretations of complex 
realities that contribute to, and can be made on the basis of, comparative analyses have 
occupied a prominent place in the social sciences (Della Porta 2013: 211). Not only is it 
a useful tool for diagnosing social problems or identifying human rights violations, but it 
is also useful for designing and monitoring public policies. For example, it allows a 
parameter to be determined when seeking different sources of critical legitimation of 
social transformations, and even enables solutions to problems or conflicts to be 
proposed.  
 
Within the social sciences, the use of comparative techniques is usually based on 
the triangulation of variables: properties and object; and in some branches of sociology 
and political science, it is focused on the strict analysis of cases, given the good results 
achieved. However, the situation is qualitatively different within legal studies. This is 
somewhat paradoxical, as the comparative perspective is even more isolated in this field, 
despite the fact that human rights have traditionally been included in it. An explanation 
of why this method is rarely used is that it is closely related to the social and socio-legal 
sciences and, to a lesser extent, to the so-called ‘pure normative inquiry’ (Örücü, 2001: 
52), which is predominant in other types of legal research on human rights. However, 
such isolation cannot be justified, since an expanded, supranational dimension is needed 
in order to establish viable legal conclusions on human rights, to be supplemented by 
approaches and contexts based on political, sociological, economic and anthropological 
research (Etzioni and Dubow 1970).  
 
I.1. A historical evolution on what to compare 
 
Engaging in comparison and in comparative analysis are significantly recurrent 
cognitive activities that are—often tacitly—used to organise and establish connections 
within social knowledge. This explains the evolution and historical significance of the 
comparative method in the generation of knowledge, as indicated by Sartori and Morlino 
(1994: 12), since it depends on, and adapts to, the various areas where it is applied. 
Therefore, there is no specific or exclusive logic of the comparison at the disciplinary 
level; rather, it is a shared logic that depends on the aim pursued, and the various means 
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available to carry it out. And yet there is an open debate and strong criticism on its 
scientific or methodological nature in the field of the social sciences and legal studies. 
This is particularly the case with regard to the historical, epistemological and 
methodological issues related to comparison, the comparative method and comparative 
studies.  
 
The classic and contemporary authors who have applied comparative 
methodology in their research, according to Morlino's classification (2005: 16-20), there 
are numerous examples that evidence the historical (r)evolution as to how comparisons 
should be made. For example, for Descartes and the logical school, there was a 
confrontation between a ‘more and less’ and ‘better and worse’, while Locke held that 
comparison is the foundation and origin of any demonstration and certainty. For Hegel, 
following the Cartesian tradition, it involved moving to a thesis/antithesis procedure, and 
it would be Auguste Comte who started to explicitly consider it as empirical/historical 
control or confrontation, and later John Stuart Mill regarded it as a phase of discovery. 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s proposal to juxtapose different forms of comparison is worth 
noting, in contrast with the ‘comparing logics’ attributed to Durkheim and Weber. While 
Durkheim opted for the method of concomitant variation, Weber put forward the method 
of concordances and differences. Within contemporary doctrine, Morlino (2005: 18) 
highlighted the contribution of Sartori and Lijphart, among others, who relied on premises 
and critiques of neo-positivist theories and they ultimately arrived at constructivist 
theories that demanded greater methodological relativism in comparative analysis.  
   
 I.2. Grounds for use: questions that can be answered by comparing 
 
Beyond understanding what comparing means, it is most important to identify 
what can be compared, why, and what the purpose of comparing is. Seeking to quickly 
establish what can be compared is often seen as a priority, leaving aside 'why' and 'for 
what purpose', even though these questions are closely linked to, and determine the 
answer to the former. None of the three questions that comparative analysis tries to 
answer has a simple answer, nor is it doctrinally settled. Hence, it has been argued that, 
if there is no specific rationale or objective (other than the general aim of explaining), the 
comparative method and comparative methodology does not properly exist. According to 
Sartori (1991) and Lipjhart (1971), practically nothing and almost nobody holds that the 
comparative method is an entity in itself. Rather, the comparative method is justified and 
developed as a specialisation within the scientific (scientific-empirical or scientific-
logical) method in general.  
 
This is confirmed by the fact that there are differences between comparison as a 
way of thinking, and comparison as a scientific procedure within the social sciences. The 
former compares simple operations, while the latter compares complex operations, 
although the difference lies in the selection and definition of the objectives and properties 
that are compared, as well as in the care taken in systematising the production and data 
analysis procedures used to perform comparisons. In this sense, it is important to have a 
preconceived theory that encompasses the objects studied and proposes a structure that is 
similar for both. If comparison is regarded as a scientific procedure, it is an intellectual 
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operation through which the states of one or more objects are placed in contrast with each 
other on the basis of at least one common property (Sartori and Morlino 1994: 23 and 
following).  
 
Therefore, according to Sartori (1991: 29 and following), comparison is a method 
for controlling generalisations or models in a specific area of study (laws, policies, 
cultures, models or systems). To compare is to contrast one thing with another, but if the 
aim is to control, then the immediate question is what is expected to be derived from 
control. Obviously, comparing or contrasting something serves to control, verify or 
falsify whether a generalisation fits the cases to which it is applied. The interest in control 
makes it possible to justify in detail why comparison is useful, and what the purpose is of 
choosing this method rather than a different one in the design of the proposed research.  
 
For example, it can be used in order to achieve the proposed research objectives; 
to develop research hypotheses that provide important results; and, most importantly, to 
control the hypothesis formulated without losing control, (a) whatever the generality level 
of the issue; (b) whatever the interest that motivates the research, be it explanatory, 
cognoscitive or with a more explicit aim; and (c) whatever point of view (either more 
strictly national or referring to more or less widespread phenomena).  
 
I.3. Main elements of comparative analysis in human rights research 
 
The question of why use a comparative methodology remains unanswered, so it 
cannot be reduced to a justification of its mere existence. However, a different issue is 
the design of comparative research in the field of human rights. For this purpose, it is 
essential to develop a theoretical structure, or at least a series of hypotheses to be 
compared, and to make decisions or choices about several of their main elements, which 
can be used as a basis to opt for one available typology or another. Some of these 
determining elements will now be discussed. 
 
1) Operation and context. It is not possible to compare systems, institutions 
or norms without knowing how they operate, and the cultural, economic and legal context 
of the society in question. Firstly, some knowledge is required of their main outlines, their 
purpose and their operating mechanisms; and it is also necessary to have empirical and 
practical knowledge that allows the conceptual categories to be separated out, so that they 
can be examined in the light of a different system. And, secondly, integrating the 
contextualisation of two systems into a study at the macro and micro levels must be 
considered. 
 
2)  Horizontal space or dimension of the comparison. The most important 
choice refers to the number of cases. This first decision also needs to consider which the 
most appropriate cases are in order for them to be included. For example, Lijphart (1971) 
recommends increasing the number of cases to as many as possible; a recommendation 
which in comparative legal research involves an almost superhuman effort. The 
underlying reasons are clear: this makes it more likely to control the hypotheses 
formulated or to reach more precise and localised hypotheses. Cases with a greater 
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number of variables are often used in collective research involving scholars of different 
nationalities.  
 
3) Establishing which and how many cases or systems to choose. This is 
inevitably linked both to the longitudinal dimension, in other words, to the scope of the 
period to be considered, and to the variables to be analysed. For example, taking into 
account the properties involved, a preselected criterion needs to be established to 
determine what is: comparable due to having fairly similar properties or characteristics; 
and what is not comparable, due to having properties or characteristics that are too 
different from others. There are three problems that must be solved at this stage: how to 
define and delimit the temporal units as a basis to observe the past, or how periodisations 
can be devised; to see if the relations established between variables observed in time have 
some specificity to them; and how to include multicollinearity (Morlino 2005: 140). That 
is, the presence of numerous factors that are strongly connected and have developed in 
parallel.  
 
4) Properties and variables. The fourth decision that the researcher must 
consider refers to the variables to be considered, that is, what is comparable and in what 
aspect. According to Lijphart (1971), the number of independent variables (causes), 
dependent variables (effects) and intervening (control) variables to be analysed must be 
reduced to include only those that are critical to guide the comparative analysis. With 
regard to the number, attention must be paid to whether the cases are increased and when 
it is necessary to extend the time considered or, on the contrary, to decrease the number 
of variables analysed. Ultimately, to obtain a good result, the theoretical conceptual 
apparatus must be well articulated and the research must be very clearly focused. Even 
though research has been conducted previously, the latest investigations must increase 
the number of aspects to be considered. 
 
5) Tertium comparation. This involves knowing how to choose similar 
systems or different systems with the same or a common social need. In the first case, the 
researcher compares systems that are similar and close to each other in as many 
characteristics as possible, which allows a large number of similar variables to be set 
aside. The important thing here is to find entities that share all the same variables except 
for one, the specific variable that is of interest. In the second case, the researcher makes 
connections between systems that differ as much as possible in everything except for the 
phenomenon being investigated.  Comparative control refers to generalised hypotheses 
where the problem results from the exceptions.    
  
Once these elements are identified, a second stage is finding the tools and different 
typologies that provide guidance as to how to make comparative research. Undoubtedly, 
there is a long doctrine tradition about the different ways of comparing, although some 
prevail more than others according to traditional disciplines involved in human rights 
research.  
 
 
ENCARNACIÓN LA SPINA 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 13 (December 2019) pp. 21-43 ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.n13.2   28 
II. SOME METHODS AND ‘TRENDING TOPIC’ EXAMPLES IN COMPARATIVE 
RESEARCH ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A brief review of the usual comparative methods in the field of human rights 
shows that the two most popular at present are legal comparison and the case study 
method. The first is traditionally employed in legal studies and the second has mostly 
been used in the social sciences, although, both can, and usually are, combined. Basically, 
this is due to the fact that this area is made up of a normative corpus between different 
universal and regional systems of protection of human rights, or to its compatibility in its 
legal-political implementation at national level.  Despite its methodological imperfections 
and its difficulty, it can become a useful analytical tool either used on a complementary, 
combined or single basis, thanks to the phenomenon of the ‘Europeanisation’ or 
‘convergence’ of national public Law and its policies (De Cruz, 1999: 45). 
 
II.1. The legal comparison method 
 
According to the above, legal comparison as a methodology of comparative 
analysis in the strict sense has not been used much since legislative positivism 
(Alchourron and Bulygin, 1971), which has traditionally set the roadmap for human rights 
research. Several authors have catalogued or integrated different movements in legal 
comparison within the so-called ‘rebellion against formalism’ and the resistance to 
legislative positivism (Moreno 2017, Somma 2014: 60). Both agree that the 
methodological component of legal comparison has a ‘parasitic’ character and lacks 
epistemological autonomy, as it constructs its methodologies by using and reformulating 
the contributions of other social sciences.  
 
Traditionally, there are two variants associated with the comparative method in 
legal studies, where there is usually an opposition between the macro-comparison and 
the micro-comparison. The first deals with the study of legal systems from a global 
perspective, while the second deals with specific issues and institutions, and requires 
thorough knowledge of the applicable assumptions and norms. Although up to five 
methods can be identified (Van Hoecke, 2015), there are no limitations, but several 
possible combinations:  
 
a) The functional method consists in examining a real social problem and 
the way in which it is resolved in different jurisdictions with similar or different 
characteristics and results. Here the analysis of the cultural context is less profound, and, 
therefore, is more accessible and less complex for the average legal researcher. However, 
the explanatory power of this method is smaller, which makes it possible to constrain the 
comparison to ‘universal facts’ such as human rights.  
 
b) The analytical method involves analysing (complex) legal concepts and 
norms in different legal systems so as to detect common parts and differences. The use of 
‘ideal types’ allows legal concepts, norms and institutions to be classified on a scale 
according to the degree of adaptation to the essential characteristics of the ‘ideal type’. 
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c) The structural method focuses on the framework of the law, or of 
reconstructed elements, by the use of an analytical approach. This is not the structure of 
each of the legal systems that are compared, but a way of understanding them.  
 
d) The historical method is almost always a necessary part of the methods 
used, as it seeks to understand the differences and commonalities between legal systems, 
and to determine whether there is a degree of affiliation to a deeply rooted tradition or, 
rather, to accidental historical events. 
 
e) The law-in-context method inevitably also has a historical dimension, but 
focuses on the current social context of the law, including culture, economics, 
psychology, religion, and others as appropriate. This involves studying a much broader 
context compared to the functional or analytical method, and using (results from) other 
disciplines. They are complementary and interdependent for a proper understanding of 
the law, and in the field of human rights this method is usually always available thanks 
to the results of research published by international agencies and organisations. 
 
Most methods derived from legal comparison allow the researcher to move from 
a superficial level of comparison to a deeper level, but the choice of method or level of 
comparison will depend mainly on the project's research question or questions. Naturally, 
different objectives often (albeit not always) involve different methods, and the current 
approach of seeking the best solution to the legal phenomenon under study is explicitly 
or implicitly the background to many comparative law research projects.  
 
Somma usually discriminates (2014: 70) between the comparison that unites and 
that which divides by establishing four groups of methodological proposals or methods: 
structuralism, functionalism, comparative economic-legal analysis, and postmodern 
schools. This means that three predominant variants have been traditionally identified in 
interdisciplinary research on human rights. First, the comparison of various systems of 
norms or jurisprudence to determine the differences or the similarities between them in 
the resolution of a certain legal problem. In other words, pursuing the best solution to the 
problem. Second, the comparative study between different state, local, regional or supra-
state normative orders in order to determine what the causal relationships between them 
are. And, third, a somewhat comparative historical study in which the evolution of a given 
legal problem, concept or institution is discussed (Morán 2002).  
 
These variants are consistent with the classification proposed by De Cruz (1999: 
7), which distinguishes between different roles. Firstly, the comparison of foreign 
systems with the domestic system in order to ascertain similarities and differences with 
an objective and systematic analysis of the solutions to a specific legal problem provided 
by different legal systems. Secondly, the investigation of the causal relationship between 
different legal systems; and finally, the comparison of the different developmental stages 
of legal systems and examining legal evolution generally according to periods and 
systems. 
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Given the different methodological proposals, the central core of the criticism of 
legal comparison has been a deeply rooted and polarised theoretical discussion about its 
contours and nature. In other words, a debate as to whether it is an autonomous legal 
science, or rather, yet another method of research applicable to other settled disciplines. 
The first is more inclined to the self-identification of comparative law as a science and its 
self-presentation at the service of a theory of progress. And the second leaves aside the 
erroneous claims of legal comparison, which range from: being downgraded to being a 
mere technical translator; to being an improvement or modification of the national or 
international normative corpus, or merely a ratification of its virtues. As a scientific 
method, legal comparison is applicable to all disciplines in legal studies (Constantinesco, 
1981: 258-260). Therefore, seeing it as a method is, in itself, a simplistic view of the 
methodology, which can be extrapolated to its purposes and object of analysis (Sacco, 
1994: 11). However, beyond the problematic issues that have marked the legal 
comparison, as Örücü reminds us, nothing prevents making its threefold nature perfectly 
compatible. It can be the only way to observe the legal situation, a research method, and 
also one of the ways of approaching reality or social transformations (Örücü, 2001: 17). 
Therefore, it can be considered as a critical extraction of legal knowledge about human 
rights that allows a greater association to be made with positive observation, and to a 
lesser degree, with philosophical speculation (Van Hoecke, 2015; Örücü, 2001: 14- 
15).Ultimately, the use of legal comparison involves promoting law in action, and not 
just law in the books.  
 
II.2. The case study method 
 
The main input of comparative analysis in political and social science is the 
diagnosis of social problems, the design of public policies, and the search for parameters 
(Piovani et al. 2017). Therefore, emphasis is placed on properties and objects, either 
through a quantitative or qualitative approach, or in the triangulation of both variables.  
 
Briefly, in this field it is easier to systematise three approaches in compared or 
comparative analysis (Della Porta 2013: 211). First, a method with an experimental, 
statistical and comparative approach. Experimental and statistical approaches are both 
very limited in the investigation of social phenomena, whereas the comparative approach 
deals with a small number of cases and is the preferred strategy for studying institutions 
and other macro-political phenomena. For instance, among others, it is relevant the 
collaboration between statisticians and other professionals (nonmathematical) in the field 
of legal comparative research on human rights, (Jabine and Claude 1992, Spirer 2001). 
The three of them convert most of the variables into parameters in order to isolate them 
from the effects of the other variables. However, there is a certain terminological 
confusion about the terms ‘comparative method’ and ‘comparative analysis’, because 
sometimes they are used to refer to all three approaches, and at other times only to one of 
them. 
 
Similarly, there are two other forms of comparison centred on properties or 
objects, which follow the classic distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods 
in social research. For example, comparative approaches that emphasise properties are 
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generally regarded to be part of a quantitative perspective, and those that emphasise 
objects are included in a qualitative perspective.   
 
Nevertheless, depending on the period analysed, a synchronous comparison can 
be made if it is decided to consider different cases at the same time, while a diachronic 
comparison can be made when analysing the same case at different, successive times in 
order to see the influence of certain phenomena that have occurred, and observe their 
change over time.  
 
Another typology determines that comparative analysis can be either close or 
remote. For the Cambridge School, there only exists the application of the close 
comparative method in the case of countries belonging to the same civilisation that have 
reached an equivalent degree of economic social and political development; whereas the 
remote comparative method basically involves different objects of study for which 
similarities are to be found in the absence of an encompassing theory.  
 
However, in the practice of the social sciences two main approaches can be 
identified as been central within comparative research. One is variable-oriented 
comparative analysis, used to establish generalised relationships between variables, and 
another is a case-oriented analysis, which aims to understand complex units, consisting 
in making exhaustive descriptions of a few examples of the same phenomenon. The latter 
occupies a prominent place in human rights research, given its characteristics and the 
level of discussion of results (Landman 2002).  
 
Generally, the purpose of this comparison is based on the analysis of comparable 
data between two or more nations, and is usually based on either a ‘cross-national’ case 
study (Kohn 1987) or on ‘cross-cultural’ case study. The typology of cross-national case 
studies is as follows: the nation as an object of study, the nation as the context of study, 
or the nation as a unit of analysis, or otherwise, it may be transnational. The typology of 
cross-cultural case studies is not a comparison between cultures, but a detailed description 
of a specific non-Western culture. 
 
In fact, the case study method is expressly chosen because it is useful for 
generating hypotheses, or because it is crucial for either confirming or refuting a theory. 
When this is the case, it is clear that case analysis and comparative analysis methods are 
complementary ways of searching that reinforce each other. Hence, the case studies in 
question must be implicitly comparative, even if they only have one variable. Sartori 
(1991) and Della Porta (2013) argued that linking universal elements to particularities 
allows categories to organised along scales of abstraction governed by the rule of 
transformation in both ascending and descending directions. For the correct selection of 
cases, according to Gerring (2001), different aspects must be taken into account: (a) 
Plenitude: broad samples help specifying propositions; (b) Boundedness: inclusion of 
relevant cases and exclusion of irrelevant ones; (c) comparability: possible similarity in 
some relevant dimensions; (d) independence: autonomy of the units; (e) 
representativeness: capacity to reflect the properties; (f) variation: spread of the scores 
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obtained; (g) analytic utility: methodological usefulness; and (h) replicability: possibility 
of repeating the model.  
 
Although the single case study tends to predominate in human rights research, the 
gradually increasing availability of global data and national and regional reports 
showcases comparative research using methods to compare a greater or lesser number of 
countries (Landman, 2002, Andreassen, 2017). This contrast of data to select either a 
single or several cases usually requires a careful selection of research sources by 
researchers if they are only drawing from secondary sources rather than direct sources.  
 
For Landman (2002, 922), comparing a greater or lower number of countries and 
the results expected are also clearly problematic issues in comparative policies. Basically, 
by comparing a larger number of countries it is possible to ensure statistical control, limit 
the selection of countries under study, cover an extensive scope in order to have a good 
theoretical component and obtain noteworthy evidence, as well as to identify cases which 
deviate from those that follow a model or benchmark. In contrast, the advantages of a 
micro comparison include strengthening the theoretical construction, avoiding conceptual 
extension, and achieving an in-depth understanding of the matter in order to make a 
selective control of the most similar or different systems to promote a good contrast of 
contexts and responses. The weaknesses of macro-comparison are the availability of data, 
and the fact that, using a broader sample there is a very abstract level of generalisation, 
with a high time cost and waste of resources. This is not the case when reducing the 
amount of evidence and having restricted field work.  
 
II.3. A practical example of applying the comparative perspective: the 
integration of migrants 
 
An illustrative example of the ‘infectious’ use of the comparative perspective 
when facing the thematic content on human rights is the integration of migrants within 
the study of international migrations. This area raises questions and provides some 
answers in connection to both the current and future scope of the comparative perspective 
and the interdisciplinary of human rights research. Migrant researchers use comparative 
in various ways as identified before and bring insights from different disciplines. 
Furthermore, they frequently develop different comparative research designs and use 
different (qualitative as well as quantitative) research methods. In addition, migration 
research was and regularly still is rather nationally oriented and researchers should go 
beyond a strictly national approach in the belief that cross-national comparison is and will 
continue to be important as international migration study. Consequently, these involve 
the level of interdisciplinary and cross-national approach recommended in those 
miscellaneous studies that encompass different analyses: legal, political, sociological, 
anthropological and economic (Martiniello 2013: 3; Fitzgerald, 2012).  
 
By way of synthesis, the comparative method in the study of migrations in Europe 
has had a delayed impact in both legal and social disciplines. And yet, significant 
literature has been produced from within European socio-political and anthropological 
studies that has made a contribution to the study of social migrations from a comparative 
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perspective. This contribution has been by means of a choice of antithetical compared 
models that have facilitated the knowledge of good practices and answers for intervention 
in host societies (Arango 2012, King 2000), or through the selection of specific cities. 
Broadly speaking, there are two major types of predominant comparisons.  
 
The first category includes those studies that compare the integration processes of 
the different groups of immigrants into the same institutional and political context of a 
nation or a city. These studies show that different groups of immigrants can follow 
different paths to achieve integration. They include the research by Bonjour (2014), Van 
Oers (2011), among others. The second category of comparative studies examines the 
integration of the same groups of immigrants in different national, federal or local 
immigration contexts (Joppke, Seidle 2012, Schain 2012). This group also includes the 
research by Koopmans (2010) on the effects that integration policies and state welfare 
regimes have on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants in eight European 
countries. Another study within this category delimits not only the spatial context but the 
‘integrable’ subjects, focusing on the integration of the so-called second generations 
through a comparative analysis of 15 cities in eight different European countries (Crul et 
al., 2012).  
 
With some exceptions, these studies have analysed integration as a national, 
regional or local compartment of their own, despite the progressive opening and 
implementation of European Union Law, which has determined the content, validity and 
direct effect of some decisive aspects of its articulation. A line of research that is 
becoming increasingly popular, based on the so-called ‘end of national models’ (Jacobs 
and Rea 2007, Joppke, 2007, Heckmann, Schnapper, 2003 ), demands more critical 
observation to analyse the different implementation of the main integration programmes 
established at European level (Freeman, 2004: 961). At the theoretical level, several 
authors (Koopmans et al., 2005: 9, Bertossi, 2009) have not only questioned the validity 
of these models for being mere ‘conceptual spaces’, but also have recommended not 
grouping countries along these ‘model’ dimensions. Far from being homogeneous blocks, 
national models are in constant contradiction with social, political and institutional 
practices. While these are not seen as 'pathologies', they are a later construct that shows 
a high level of strategic ambiguity and can be easily manipulated by the different actors 
who seek different results on the object of study (Bertossi, 2009).  
 
A polarised debate about the theoretical construction of these compared models 
has been increasing, because the convergence of integration policies has made the use of 
distinctive national models manifestly obsolete (Joppke, 2007: 2). However, they have 
continued to be promoted by other studies, including those by Jacobs and Rea (2007), 
which have underlined the distinctive and continuous nature of European integration 
policies and the value of working with traditional classifications, due to their analytical 
potential over integration models (Jacobs; Rea 2007: 265). Bertossi has successfully 
argued against this, by saying that it is much more problematic to prove their existence 
between countries grouped on the basis of the philosophies or cultures of national 
integration, and even more so based on models. Basically, it is easy to conclude that these 
predetermined differences are explained by pre-established models of integration of 
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immigrants and citizens without accounting for the situation of migrants, the orientations 
of the policy, and the structure of public discourse in the different countries (Bertossi, et 
al. 2012). 
  
Consequently, based on the reconsideration or rejection of certain pre-established 
variables in integration models, international comparisons pose serious methodological 
problems, given the lack of adequate data (Favell, 2003 ). In fact,  different countries use 
different statistical categories, or even lack official data, and the composition of the 
immigrant population varies according to the countries, the types and the opportunities 
provided by integration models designed to properly addressing migratory flows 
(Triadafilopoulos, 2011). Again, in line with this trend, the existing approaches are 
largely general. As a result of the new requirements for civic integration being 
implemented, attempts have been made to categorise models that mostly limit themselves 
to a description, without establishing comparisons with other cases (Brubacker, 
Michalowski, et al. 2006; Bauböck, Collett, et al., 2006). This is also evident in the study 
of social welfare models which, according to Freeman (1996), are inevitably excluding 
(Koopmans 2010); and it also occurs in the construction of indicators that omit certain 
basic social protection rights, such as health care, education, housing and social support, 
and the differentiation of rights by categories of migrants.  
 
III. A SWOT ASSESSMENT OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
After a brief presentation of the different techniques and typologies to carry out a 
comparative analysis in human rights research, it is necessary to reflect on what the best 
method is for legal comparisons, and if a comparison in fact occurs. There is clearly a 
substantial number of decisions, tools and choices to be taken into account to design a 
comparative study, and even more so when it is a legal comparison. The interdisciplinary 
nature of human rights means that the risks involved are very different and highly 
interrelated. For example, when choosing the research question, it is important to adhere 
to specific, and precise criteria in terms of the countries, regulatory systems, cultures, 
societies and geopolitical contexts to be studied. An interest in a specific geographical or 
geopolitical context, family, legal branch can lead to putting any of those above the 
formulation of a research project, which can alter the sequence of tasks involved: research 
topic; working hypothesis; choice of countries; data collection. 
 
A method is a systematic and functional way of working to ensure the attainment 
of the end pursued, and the researcher has a duty to decide to what extent the categories 
used must be either inclusive, or narrow and discriminant. Therefore, how, and why and 
for what purpose a study is conducted depends on the researcher's own experience. It 
cannot be said whether the concepts should be fine-tuned and the classification carried 
out before or after the selection of the cases or the temporal range to be analysed. And 
yet, different strategies may have been followed according to the specific method used 
within the comparative analysis selected.  
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In any case, methods do not exist in the abstract; rather, methods are chosen to 
best meet the objectives of the comparison, and no single method suffices. Any 
comparison and, therefore, any comparative legal analysis in human rights research, must 
be more than an enumeration of and contrast between legal texts or instruments for the 
protection of human rights in different geopolitical contexts. Paradoxically, there is more 
consensus as to what a comparative analysis is not, than as to defining what it is. This 
justifies the strong criticism it receives about what it is not. Strictly speaking, comparing 
is not collecting norms on the object of study from all over the world with no connection 
between them other than the compiler, and no other justification than to seemingly deal 
with the same social event relevant to human rights. A comparative approach is not 
discriminating between comparative studies and those that are merely exegetical, nor is 
it simultaneously examining the differences and similarities, assuming that the objects to 
be compared are not totally identical or totally different. This would not be met by a 
parallel presentation of two or more systems, or two or more institutions belonging to 
different legal systems, as the intention to compare would be purely instrumental, and not 
a purpose in itself. Similarly, the criteria indicated above would not be fulfilled by a mere 
analysis of textual data if the effects of the implementation of the rule are left aside, or 
the socio-cultural implications of language and its geographical variants are disregarded, 
by providing references to foreign authors who discuss the same topic and not making an 
effort to compare.  
 
Ultimately, a legal comparison is not a search engine for models with the sole 
purpose of proposing possible reforms or valid parameters for the creation of a uniform 
regulatory framework. For example, legal transplants are more of an objective or a result 
than an actual comparative method. What seems to work well in a one regulatory system 
may not do in a different legal system due to the different contexts involved. Hence, the 
mere fact of ‘copying’ or ‘emulating’ foreign legislation could hardly be considered a 
‘method’ per se. This is typically an example of lack of method in comparative law (Van 
Hoejk 2015). A legal comparative method would not be taking the system or systems 
characteristic of a legal family as the most suitable and merely making a comparison of 
regulations, institutions, or jurisdictions. Rather this try to assess the similarities of a 
given social problem or need, or of what would be the necessary political, regulatory and 
other kinds of interventions that should be adopted to obtain optimal results (Cappelletti, 
1994: 17). 
 
III.1. Strengths…. 
 
If the purpose is to use the legal comparative method on human rights to persuade, 
providing a catalogue of uncritical virtues and praise for a method that undoubtedly is 
characterised by a complex vision of the objects studied may be a misjudgement. The 
strengths are: 
 
(a) A dynamic, non-static vision. It provides a harmonic amalgam between the 
evolution and the diffusion of the object studied that makes it possible to ‘qualitatively’ 
contextualise the social situation under observation. The purpose is either to show 
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divergences and synergies, or to develop general propositions or hypotheses that can 
explain and describe future trends. 
 
(b) Versatility and functionality. It raises interest in completing or seeking new 
angles of analysis to continue to critically observe and analyse (Merryman, 1999). This 
means that the socio-legal reality can be contrasted or distorted, with the sole purpose of 
gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Law and society, by 
apprehending all its complexity. 
 
(c) Heterogeneous references and sources.  This involves a greater effort when 
selecting the appropriate bibliography, not only by merely compiling literature but also 
through interviews with different stakeholders and agents that help to better contextualise 
the scope of the analysis. 
 
(d) A more factual, diachronic vision. This vision is at the same time synchronic, 
and provides further insight into the elements that de facto determine and hinder a greater 
drive for innovation based on the results obtained. It is therefore used to improve and 
consolidate knowledge of human rights and understand law in context.  
 
(e) Development of the explanatory function. It sharpens the capacity of 
description and synthesis of differentiating and common elements. It seeks to explain 
both the differences and the similarities, exploring existing patterns and processes.  
 
III.2. Weaknesses…. 
 
The purpose of noting the weaknesses of legal comparative analysis is not to 
discourage its unequivocal methodological capabilities, but rather to bring them to the 
fore. In this way, they could be turned into opportunities for methodological improvement 
that minimise future threats through practice. Identifying possible weaknesses is not an 
exhaustive task, but a reflexive act intended to explore its uses and the experience gained 
in the implementation of the comparative perspective in the short- and long-term.  
 
(a) Sociolinguistic problems are among the most common problems that 
comparatists must face (Sacco 1984: 17). It is reasonable to carry out a comparison on 
contexts, sources and systems in a language that is known to the researcher; otherwise 
there is a risk of showing various national data in parallel without addressing aspects that 
may arise from it. The doctrine basically relates this to the complexity in managing 
specific legal terminology or assessing cross-cultural systems by researchers from other 
countries (Örücü, 2001: 57);  
 
(b) A difficult balance between practical and theoretical activity. As it provides a 
laboratory for the analysis of different issues that are treated as variables or cases that are 
juxtaposed, compared and contrasted for practical purposes, solely depending on the 
actual availability of data, the theoretical component may be neglected. 
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(c) It is an expositional resource rather than an explanatory one.  It is one of the 
best ways to discover resemblances between similar and different legal systems or models 
is to explain similarities and even differences to construct theories to the extent that the 
comparison is a dialogue in and about a given phenomenon (Örücü, 2001: 34). 
 
(d) Independence. Comparison and the comparative analyses have no subsistence 
in themselves, since the methodologies that they comprise can be extended to other 
disciplines. Basically, they would be in terms of lege ferenda in that they make it possible 
to find more efficient or simply better answers to solve similar problems. 
 
(e) Excessive purposes and expectations. Sometimes research objectives can be 
too ambitious, due to a lack of awareness of the limits of all comparative research. 
 
(f) Difficulty involved in making proper comparisons. This is often due to the 
complexity of concepts, and the abstraction levels, the collection of data, but also to the 
presence of phenomena of diffusion, imitation, importation and the like; 
 
(g) Incommensurability. Every empirical or normative concept is deeply and 
inextricably linked to the context in which it is produced, so that there must be a clear 
perception of the problems and the environment to which they refer or where they are 
applied (Morlino, 2005). 
 
(h) Conjunctural coincidence. This implies that any phenomenon under study can 
have different causes associated with it, which makes it more difficult to find a 
satisfactory explanation.  
 
SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS: DISPELLING FALSE MYTHS 
 
Comparative research not only helps to explain something about the world, but 
also to predict and contrast future trends, past traces, synergies or even convergences that 
may be derived from more than one case within and outside a given field. Therefore, the 
comparative process can make many important contributions to the generation of 
knowledge in both substantive and methodological analysis. Although the action of 
comparing is an almost instinctive reflex, a comparison is only reflexive if it achieves a 
substantive and methodological balance.   
 
The comparative approach makes it possible to distort images in a way that other 
analytical perspectives would not allow, but without compromising the viability of an 
interdisciplinary analysis. The findings from research on human rights, and in particular, 
on the study of the integration of migrants, show relevant evidences that the comparative 
method is becoming increasingly appealing and established. However, there is still much 
to explore about the centrality of its methodological and epistemological approach, that 
is, the possibility of comparison in itself, the object of comparison and its role in 
interdisciplinary fields of research. It has been widely accepted that the epistemological 
and methodological dimension in political science and sociology has been more often 
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used and has been more fertile, while its implementation in other fields, such as Law, 
requires more sophisticated technical knowledge.  
 
In fact, the first barrier faced by legal researchers embarking on comparative legal 
research is the approach to methodological issues, which can easily cause them to become 
disoriented. Basically, not all perspectives or comparative research approaches can be 
considered useful for a legal comparison in strict terms. The interdisciplinary nature of 
human rights also favours the case study method to the detriment of the legal comparison 
method. Legal comparison is more rigid and cannot be limited only to the use of foreign 
law by legislators or courts, but also to the key doctrine and methodological questions 
and answers to identify explanatory factors, legal frameworks, and conditions for intra- 
or inter-state application.  
 
However, the protection and monitoring of human rights inevitably merits the 
effort of engaging in comparison in order to obtain a reliable understanding of the context, 
or to identify possible gaps in their application. Here the comparative approach is a key 
method for the analysis of the level of compliance with human rights in an increasingly 
fragmented and global legal framework. Even though there is no agreement on the type 
of methodology to be followed, or even on the methodologies that could be used in the 
field of human rights. It is possible to combine different comparative methods, since they 
are complementary and not mutually exclusive. Undoubtedly, the main priority of the 
comparative approach is its functionality and versatility to achieve total optimisation and 
a deep contextual understanding of human rights globally.  The first myth to be dispelled 
is that it is necessary to have a complete ‘tool box’ or a strict methodological roadmap. 
The essence of the comparative method is engaging in contrast, in order to identify 
differences or similarities at the national, regional or supranational level.  
 
However, as Sartori recalls, the theoretical component of the comparison is 
difficult to ‘manage’ without a compass (1994: 12) and sometimes, even having one, it is 
necessary to know how to orient and reorient oneself constantly. The most difficult task 
is knowing why a comparison is to be made. Once this has been ascertained, one can 
identify an object for comparison, and address this issue on three phases (Moran 2012: 
525): 
 
1) Choosing phase: the importance of having prior knowledge about the 
object of comparison for the appropriate choice of the research topic. This requires 
developing the cognitive function. In other words, to investigate or analyse realities in 
different countries or contexts to better understand the complexity of the phenomena 
studied and the disparities between them. 
 
2) Descriptive phase: the parallel study of systems to discover their structure 
and how they operate to enhance the identifying function, and be able to explore 
analogies and differences, as well as attempting to provide tentative explanations for their 
nature or their internal logic. 
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3) Concluding phase: allows reinforcing both the explanatory function, by 
arguing which is the preferable explanation, and controlling equally plausible hypotheses. 
It also has a critical and applicative function, by (re)formulating conceptual 
interpretations based on doctrine and theories on the observed similarities and the 
differences. 
 
In contrast, the second barrier does not focus so much on what it is being 
compared, as this depends on the sources of comparison and the levels of abstraction with 
respect to the comparison.  It rather focuses on how to compare, in order to understand 
the resources, skills and aptitudes necessary, and a sense of boundaries and moderation. 
Undoubtedly, being strict with moderation can sometimes lead to reducing or limiting the 
initial research design, but ultimately, unlike other methods, it makes it possible to 
approach the complexity of the object of study from other angles that are not exhausted 
and can continue to be explored.  
 
It is undeniable that comparative analysis is a technique that involves significant 
risks, and therefore it is associated with a number of false myths. But this does not mean 
that comparison should not be used for fear of not being able to control the object of 
investigation or of misusing the variables to compare. Rather, it is crucial to look for a 
reflective balance. An equilibrium that is necessary for the thesis of the 
incommensurability of concepts, which are so imbued with contexts, and so rooted in 
their respective culture, history and locality, that they are incommensurable from another 
methodological perspective.  
 
All that remains is to readjust the compass and take as a starting point that it is 
preferable to ‘compare adagio’ than not at all. Research depends on the ability to achieve 
that the point of arrival is a rhythmic, synchronised and measured sequence, and therefore 
this comparison must be done ‘adagio ma non troppo’. 
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